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Abstract
The network formation model described in this research paper is
based on the connection model of Bala and Goyal [1]. We extend this
model by introducing two properties: heterogeneity of players and se-
quentiality of the network formation process. These two characteristics
modify the emergence of equilibrium and efficient networks. Our main
theoretical finding is that sequentiality is the main determinant of the
equilibrium network while heterogeneity is secondary. The equilibrium
often requires that the last player of the game incurs a large part of the
linking costs. On the contrary, the leader does not create links at the
equilibrium. In the following of the paper we build an experimental
protocol. Our purpose is to analyse whether our model predicts be-
haviour in the laboratory and whether individuals are more attracted
by the equilibrium or by efficiency.
1 Introduction
Networks are prominent in many real life examples. The success of Facebook,
Linked In or other Web social networks shows the increasing importance of
networks in our society. They have also been studied by many researchers
to understand market sharing agreements [2], job search [6], friendship [11]
or co-authorship [22] and [24]. This is a very wide field that allows to com-
prehend numerous situations. In our paper we study social and economic
networks theoretically and experimentally. Jackson [21] wrote a theoreti-
cal survey about network formation that shows the great variety of models.
Kosfeld [23] also made a survey but from an experimental point of view to
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show the different applications in the laboratory with human subjects.
A social or economic network is composed by agents who create links.
In this literature, links are valuable but also costly. They need to make a
tradeoff between the value of a link and its cost. Studying this field allows a
better understanding of linking decisions. The purpose is to answer the fol-
lowing questions: who makes the first move to connect with another player?
why do people want to link with some agents and not others? why does an
agent accept to pay a cost for a connection? To sum up, the central question
of this paper is which type of networks emerges and for which reasons.
We base our theoretical model on a seminal paper in the network for-
mation field: the connection model of Bala and Goyal [1] (henceforth BG).
In their model players can create links unilaterally (without the agreement
of the potential partners). The formation of a link is costly and only the
initiator of the link pays this cost. Players can form direct links but they can
also be connected indirectly with other players and benefit from them, i.e.
“friends of my friends are also my friends”. These players are indirect links.
The authors distinguish two models: the one-way flow model and the
two-way flow model. In the former, information is only received by the ini-
tiator of the link and in the latter, both players benefit from the connection
(even if one player did not pay for it). To summarize, in the first model,
players benefit only from links they created. In the second model, players
benefit from all the connections even if they did not pay for them. In addi-
tion, in both models, players benefit from indirect links.
Bala and Goyal want to characterize the strict Nash networks. A network
is strict Nash if no player has a strict incentive to change strategy if the other
players keep the same strategy. The result of the one-way flow model is that
each player should create only one link with another player. The architec-
ture of this network looks like a circle. This equilibrium network is called
the wheel. For the two-way flow model the strict Nash network is the center-
sponsored star network (CSS) with one central player and peripheral players.
A center-sponsored star is a network where the player in the center forms
links with every other player and others form no link. The central player
sponsors the whole network. In this network, peripheral players benefit from
everybody without paying anything. The main issue with a star network is
that one player has to take the particular position of central player. This
player has to incur all the linking costs. This position is very disadvanta-
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geous and leads to the instability of the network. The central player does
not want to stay in this position and has an incentive to remove links.
Our model is based on the second model of BG. We chose the two-way
flow model because of the instability and the asymmetry of the equilibrium
network that can be studied theoretically and experimentally. Indeed in the
laboratory the two-way flow model leads to interesting psychological and so-
ciological conclusions. We complete the research of BG by introducing two
characteristics.
The main contribution of our research paper is that we study network
formation in a sequential manner. It means that players make their linking
decisions one after another. The major part of the literature studies simulta-
neous network formation, where players can take decisions in the same time.
Our paper is inspired by the Stackelberg competition [29] in the sense that
one player is the market leader and the others are followers. The market
leader plays first and the others play after him and in a sequential manner.
This assumption has been widely used in industrial economics with the ex-
ample of competing firms. Nevertheless sequentiality can be transposed in
network formation models for a more general purpose. Sequentiality brings
new perspectives and represents situations where players can analyse the de-
cisions of preceding players. Moreover players that play at the beginning of
the formation of the network have more power to orientate the network. It
can be applied to many economic situations. Agents may need time to cre-
ate links and simultaneous decisions are not always possible. For example,
before the collaboration of two firms, they analyse the preceding collabora-
tions. It can also explain the formation of co-authorship between scientists.
An author can look at the preceding co-authorship of the scientist before
creating a link with him.
In addition we study network formation among heterogeneous players.
The major part of the literature assumes homogeneity of players. In our set-
ting, players have different characteristics. Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst
[17] introduced heterogeneity in the two-way flow model of BG. More pre-
cisely they fixed arbitrary heterogeneous costs of linking and heterogeneous
values of accessing others. The latter means that some players can benefit
more from their connections than other players. They have a better capacity
to absorb the value of others. Their results are similar than the results of
BG in many cases but there is one major difference. Their main finding is
that an equilibrium can be asymmetric and stable. A network is asymmetric
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if payoffs and strategies are heterogenous among players. The star is consid-
ered as asymmetric because players have different strategies and payoffs are
unequal between the central player and peripheral players. In BG the central
player has an incentive to remove links. But in the model of Galeotti et al.
with the introduction of heterogeneity some natural candidates emerge to
take the particular place of the central player (players with a high-value or a
low-cost of linking). Consequently the star network is a strict Nash network
because no player wants to deviate from his strategy.
Like in their paper, we use heterogeneous costs of linking. However in-
stead of introducing heterogeneous values of accessing others, we study het-
erogeneous personal values (own value of the player). The profit of a player
depends on the value of his partners and the costs he paid to form links.
Sequentiality and heterogeneity can be the solution for the instability issue.
In our setting players with a low cost of linking or a higher value than the
others are natural candidates as central player. To sum up, our framework
is based on the two-way flow model and we add two properties: the hetero-
geneity property of Galeotti et al. and the principle of sequentiality.
The first part of the paper describes our theoretical model with the two
properties (sequentiality and heterogeneity). The purpose of our paper is to
see the contribution of these particular characteristics in the model. We want
to see the changes induced by these two characteristics in the emergence of
networks. Our hypothesis is that they will partly solve the instability prob-
lem that BG witnessed with their equilibrium network (the star). The main
theoretical result of our paper is that sequentiality is more important than
heterogeneity in the formation of networks. Indeed sequentiality is the ma-
jor determinant of the equilibrium. The heterogeneity property is secondary.
Globally, the player in last position is often the central player of the CSS
at the equilibrium. As a consequence he pays all the linking costs. The
preceding players know that this last player will have no choice but creating
links if he wants a positive profit. They can remain passive and let the last
player sacrifice himself and bear all the linking costs.
In the second part of the paper we are going to build an experimental pro-
tocol. We want to test our model in the laboratory to see the differences with
the theoretical results. The laboratory allows us to create a “microeconomic
environment [...] where adequate control can be maintained and accurate
measurement of relevant variables guaranteed” [32]. More precisely, in a lab-
oratory the experimenter can control the characteristics of the players and
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the different variables of the procedure. Moreover he knows all the poten-
tial links that can be formed and the information accessed by each player.
Two papers tested the connection model in the laboratory ([3], [13]). The
authors witnessed the instability of the equilibrium with the two-way flow
model. Their results were not in accordance with the theoretical predictions.
To solve this issue, Goeree, Riedl and Ule [19] introduced heterogeneity of
players. Thanks to heterogeneity, “natural candidates” emerge to take the
particular position of central player (low-cost or high-value player).
In addition in our procedure we introduce objective (or endogenous) char-
acteristics. In the major part of the literature, the characteristics of the
players are exogenous and arbitrary. The experimenter randomly gives char-
acteristics. In our setting, each player reveals his personal value and cost
thanks to tests that will be displayed before the network formation game.
The fact that players are at the origin of their characteristics should lead to
more strategic and self-interested behaviours because they feel legitimate.
Experimentally, our purpose is threefold. First, we want to test the re-
sults of the theoretical model. The goal is to analyse if equilibrium networks
emerge with our framework. An issue may be coordination problems. We
investigate if decentralized decisions (players cannot communicate) can lead
to the equilibrium and if agents are able to coordinate without the help of
an external authority. However, players do not only follow their self-interest.
They may want to improve the well-being of the others and have social mo-
tives. More precisely, they can have efficiency and fairness concerns. These
concepts describe a preference for a high aggregate payoff and for egalitar-
ian payoffs. Consequently our second purpose is to see the impact of these
motives on the emergence of networks. Finally, our last purpose is to test
the contribution of objective characteristics instead of exogenous and arbi-
trary characteristics. We analyse this feature thanks to a control treatment
where characteristics will be completely random. The literature shows that
if players earn their position of leader, they play more strategically than if
it is due to a random assignment. Consequently endogenous characteristics
may counter the effect of social motives. The goal is to see how and why
endogenous characteristics change the formation of network and the type of
network structure that emerges.
In the following of the paper section 2 presents the experimental literature
on network formation. In section 3 we describe the theoretical model and
its results. Then in section 4 we explain the experimental procedure and we
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provide our predictions of experimental results in section 5. Finally section
6 concludes.
2 Experimental literature
Only few experiments have been made on network formation. A major part
of the experiments deals with network formation where mutual consent is
necessary to form a link ([5], [10], [27], [28], [30], [31]). In these experi-
ments both players must agree to form a link and they share the linking
cost. Only few experimental papers tested the connection model of Bala and
Goyal where networks are directed ([3],[13] and [19]). In these experiments
unilateral consent is sufficient to form a link. We focus on these last papers
in this literature review as they deal with the model of Bala and Goyal.
These three papers are presented in this section and will guide us for our
experimental protocol.
These papers are complementary. The first paper is the experiment of
Falk and Kosfeld [13]. They tested the original model (both one-way and two-
way flow model) with homogeneous values and costs and where players can
form links simultaneously. Their main finding is that the connection model
predicts outcomes very well with the one-way flow model but it largely fails
to predict the data with the two-way flow model. Concretely strict Nash net-
works emerged in the one-way but not in the two-way flow treatment. They
found three reasons to explain this phenomenon: asymmetry, efficiency and
fairness. First, it may be due to asymmetry. As we said a network is asym-
metric if payoffs and strategies are very different across players. The strict
Nash equilibrium of the one-way flow model is the wheel and it is the CSS
for the two-way flow model. There is no asymmetry with the wheel because
each player forms one link and pays for one linking cost. However the star
requires a central player that builds the whole network. There may be a
coordination problem to find this particular player. Strategies and payoffs
are very heterogeneous with the star. However asymmetry does not explain
everything. Indeed in some cases (where the cost is high) the strict Nash
network is the empty network (no links are created) which is symmetric.
Players never played this equilibrium, probably for one reason: efficiency.
The concern for efficiency describes the fact that players want to increase the
aggregate payoff of the network. A network is efficient if it maximizes the
total profit of the network. In the experiment of Falk and Kosfeld, players
preferred to create links instead of having the empty network even if it was
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not the equilibrium. Finally the authors developed the idea of inequality
aversion (fairness). This social preference is very important for the partic-
ipants. It means that players do not like large gap of payoffs. They prefer
homogeneous profits and reject inequalities. With the CSS in the two-way
flow model, payoffs are not equal between the central and peripheral players
because the central player has to bear all the linking costs. On the contrary
for the wheel, payoffs are equal.
Further to the paper of Falk and Koslfeld, Berninghaus, Ott and Vogt
[3] tried to understand the mitigated results with the two-way flow model.
Like Falk and Kosfeld they used the connection model but focused on the
two-way flow model. They introduced some theoretical changes to create a
favourable environment for the emergence of equilibrium networks. For that
the authors distinguished active, passive and indirect neighbours. If two
players i and j are linked and that i is the initiator of the link, j is an active
neighbour of i. On the contrary, i is a passive neighbour of j. Finally, the
active or passive neighbours of an active neighbour are indirect neighbours.
With our example, if i paid to form a link with another player j, he can
benefit from the neighbours of j but j cannot benefit from the neighbours
of i. This environment changes the theoretical results. Indeed the strict
Nash equilibrium is no more the CSS or the empty network, it is the empty
network or the periphery-sponsored star (PSS) where each peripheral player
pays for one link with the central player and the central player remains in-
active. This network is sponsored by peripheral players. The experimental
results of Berninghaus et al. [3] differ from the results of Falk and Kosfeld.
They found that half of the groups reached the strict Nash network (the
PSS) or converged to this network. They witnessed a strong learning effect.
There are few reasons that can explain the differences between the two types
of results. The first reason is complexity. Indeed the star is asymmetric
and coordinating on the CSS is even more complicated than coordinating
on the PSS. With the CSS, one player needs to link to all other players and
peripheral players need to stay inactive. For the PSS only one player needs
to understand that he has to remain passive. The other players only have
to create one link. The second reason is inequality aversion. Indeed the
strategy and payoff inequalities are very large with the CSS while payoffs
are quite egalitarian with the PSS.
Even if Berninghaus et al. have interesting results, they do not solve
the problem of the CSS. One paper tried to find an environment where the
CSS can emerge in the laboratory. It is the paper of Goeree, Riedl and Ule
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[19]. The authors noticed that stars rarely emerge in network experiments
due to asymmetry, inequalities and instability. However many structures are
star-like networks in real life examples with central players and peripheral
players who are less active. The purpose of their paper is to show under
which conditions a CSS can emerge. They based their model on the two-way
flow model of BG [1] with decay (the value of a link is weighted with the
distance between the two players). A player benefits from the value of his
partners (weighted with distance) but pays a linking cost if he is the initia-
tor of the link. The differences with the two preceding papers is that they
introduced heterogeneity of players. They studied treatments where some
agents had a lower linking cost or a higher value. Linking costs and values
are different across players. The payoff of a player increases with the value
of his partners but decreases with distance and cost.
They designed different treatments. The baseline treatment assumes ho-
mogeneity of players. In the other treatments, the experimenters introduced
one “low-cost” player or one “high-value” player (or both) in a group of “nor-
mal” players to see their contributions. Players had a complete information.
Agents knew their own type (normal, high-value or low-cots) and the types
of the players in their group.
We do not detail their theoretical results but globally the strict Nash net-
works are star networks with the “special agent” in the center or the empty
network. The next results concerns efficiency. A network is efficient if it
maximizes the sum of individual payoffs in the network. For the treatments
with a high-value player, the efficient network is the star (CSS or PSS) with
the high-value player in the center. Finally for the treatments with a low-cost
player, the CSS with the low-cost agent in the center is the efficient network.
In summary, the efficient network is a star network for every treatment.
However the star is asymmetric and can lead to uneven payoffs. If players
are inequality averse, they can feel envious (they have a lower payoff than
the others) or guilty (they have a higher payoff than the others). The au-
thors checked the impact of “natural” levels of inequality. They introduced
concerns for fairness in the utility function. They found that theoretically
strict Nash networks remain strict Nash even with a concern for fairness.
Here is the description of their experimental procedure and results. The
experiment lasted for 30 rounds and groups of players remained the same dur-
ing the whole experiment (partner matching). The results of the experiment
8
are the following. The empty and complete networks never emerged. Their
main finding is that the presence of a high-value agent facilitates the forma-
tion of equilibrium and star networks. Indeed from 40 to 50% of networks are
strict Nash when there is a high-value agent. They are very important for
coordination. The presence of a low-cost player did not have the same effect.
A detailed analysis shows that stars did not emerge a lot at the beginning
of the experiment. However they became increasingly prominent over time.
The repetition of the process and the learning effect are important to see the
emergence of stars. Globally stars prevailed in treatments with a high-value
agent in the center.
Finally a last point is to understand the reasons of the difference between
treatments with a high-value agent and with a low-cost agent. The problem
with the treatment with a low-cost agent is that this player pays for all the
links and feels envious against the others. He can decide to remove all his
links because of inequality aversion. However a high-value agent is the center
of the PSS at the equilibrium. Peripheral players pay for the links. He does
not have incentives to deviate and peripheral players would hurt themselves
more by removing a link.
The three issues (asymmetry, efficiency and fairness) described in these
papers may play a great role for our experiment. We will probably have
experimental results that are not in accordance with our theoretical results.
We develop this part later in the paper.
These three papers inspired our protocol. The experiment of Goeree et al.
is close to our experimental protocol. However even if strict Nash networks
emerge in some situations with a high-value player, the presence of a low-
cost player does not facilitate the emergence of equilibrium networks. We
add some features in order to solve this issue. We have two major differences
with their experimental procedure. The first difference is that link formation
is sequential. It brings a new perspective where the market leader (that
can be compared with the high-value or low-cost agent in their model) has
another advantage: he plays first. It will probably change the emergence
of networks. We think that sequentiality will bring more stability. Players
can take the time to analyse the actions of the preceding players. They take
their decisions in accordance with the actions of the preceding players and
with the potential actions of the following players. The second difference
is that values and costs are assigned based on players’ performance elicited
in a previous stage and are not given by the experimenter. We expect that
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this will reinforce the role of leader, because players earned their position.
The aim is testing whether in our setting high-value and low-cost players
facilitate the coordination of the network or not.
3 Theoretical model
3.1 Notation
Let G be the set of possible networks. The network g ∈ G is a pair (N,L)
where N is the set of players, with i and j two typical players, and L repre-
sents the set of links. In our model we limit the number of players, n, at four.
It is quite a small number but there are many potential networks (stars, line,
wheel, empty, complete...). A link between player i and player j is denoted
by ij. With a slight abuse of notation we write gij = 1 when players i and
j has formed a link in g and we write gij = 0 when players i and j has not
formed a link in g. If two players i and j have formed a link in g, then i
and j are adjacent players. We say that they are directly connected. A link
between two players i and j is identified with the existence of a pairwise
relation between them. A path between player i and j is a sequence of links
i0i1, i1i2 . . . , im−1, im where ikik+1 ∈ g for k ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, and i = i0,
j = im. In the following, we say that two players are indirectly connected
if there exists a path between them but they are not adjacent. In this case
these players have an indirect link.
The linking actions of a player k are denoted by g(k). As we have four
players, each player can decide to form a link (or not) with the three other
players, i.e. g(i) = {0, 1}3 for all i ∈ N . For player 1, we have g(1) =
(g12, g13, g14) (similar definition for the other players). Let g(−i) be the ac-
tions taken by players other than i. For instance, g(−1) = {g(2), g(3), g(4)}.
With a slight abuse of notation we write g = {g(i), g(−i)} for all i ∈ N .
Finally, let g−k = {g(1), ..., g(k − 1)} and g
+
k = {g(k + 1), ..., g(4)} represent
respectively the actions of players that play before and after k.
Let Ni(g) represent the players observed by i and N
d
i (g) be the set of
links created by i; µi(g) and µ
d
i (g) are their respective cardinal numbers. A
network g′ ⊂ g is a component of g if there is a path between i and j in g′
and if for all i in g′ and k in g, gik implies that k also belongs to g
′.
Player i needs to pay a connection cost ci. This cost of linking can be
different across players. The costs of linking are a n-tuple c = (c1, ...cn).
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Players have also heterogeneous values. The values of players are a n-tuple
V = (V1, ...Vn) where Vi is the value of player i. In our model information
can flow without being altered. In the language of BG we say that there is
no decay. It means that whatever the distance between two players, infor-
mation will keep the same value.
As two links can be created between each pair of players and that we
have four players, we have 212 potential networks. We define formally some
networks that will be useful in the following of the paper.
The empty network is the network g in which there is no link at all.
On the contrary the complete network is a network g when there is a link
between all pairs of players. A star network is a network g where there is
a player, say player i who is adjacent with all other players while players
j 6= i are adjacent only with i. We say that i is the central player of the
star and players j 6= i are peripheral players. As our model is directed, we
have three types of star networks. In the periphery sponsored star (PSS), all
peripheral players pay for a link with the central player. On the contrary,
the central player is the initiator of all the links with the peripheral players
in the center-sponsored star (CSS). Finally in the mixed star both the central
player and peripheral players pay for links. The wheel is a network where
each player forms only one link so that the architecture of the network looks
like a circle. Finally g is connected if it has a unique component. A network
g is minimally connected if the network is connected and there is no cycle in
the network (unique path between all pairs of players).
3.2 Structure of the game
We build two treatments (for our model and our experiment).
Cost-treatment
The first treatment is called the cost-treatment (henceforth CT). In this
treatment costs are heterogeneous (different ci for all i ∈ N) but values are
homogeneous (Vi = V for all i ∈ N). This treatment depicts situations where
some players can create links more easily than others but they have the same
value. An agent has a better capacity to form links and to coordinate the
network. For instance a firm can have better communication skills than the
others. It can collaborate with other firms more easily. Another example is
the case of friendship. Some children or adolescents are more sociable. They
can create links with other individuals more easily. It does not involve a big
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effort. They are more popular and are the center of a friendship network.
Value-treatment
The second treatment is called the value-treatment (henceforth VT). In
this treatment values are heterogeneous (different Vi for all i ∈ N) but costs
are homogeneous (ci = c for all i ∈ N). It describes situations with more or
less valuable agents. Again with the example of firms, some collaborations
are more valuable than others. Co-authorship among scientists is another
example. Authors have different “values”. A PhD student prefers to be linked
with a reputed author. His benefit will probably be higher. This student
accepts to pay the linking cost to work with this author. The reputed author
also benefits from this connection but to a lesser extent.
Sequentiality
A main difference with the major part of the literature on networks is
that we chose a sequential setting. It means that players will play one after
another. In our model one player is the “market leader” and the others are
“followers”. The market leader plays first and the followers play after him in
a sequential manner. After the market leader made his decisions, the other
players can also form links one after another. Let ρ = i, j, k, l be the rule of
order. For the CT we rank players according to their cost. Formally, ρi < ρj
if and only if ci < cj . The lowest-cost player is the market leader and plays
first. We assume that a player who has a lower cost of linking can form
links more easily. After the first player took his decisions, the second lowest-
cost player can play, then the third player and finally the fourth can play
(highest-cost player of the group). For the VT we rank players according to
their value. In this situation ρi < ρj if and only if Vi > Vj . The highest-
value player is the market leader and plays first. We assume that a player
with a higher value deserves the position of leader. When the first player
has finished to play, the second highest-value player can play, then the third
plays and finally the fourth can play (lowest-value player of the group).
3.3 Profit function
The profit of a player i is positively related with the value of his direct
and indirect parters and is negatively related with the costs of the links he
creates. For the CT, the profit of i is:
pii(g) = µi(g)V − µ
d
i (g)ci (1)
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For the VT, the profit of i is:
pii(g) = µi(g)Vj − µ
d
i (g)c (2)
3.4 Equilibrium notion and efficiency
The Nash equilibrium ignores the sequential structure of the game [25]. We
need the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium where players reassess their
plans as play proceeds. The SPE that we present is adapted from Bialas [4].
We need some notations to define our concept.
Let G be the set of networks. As we said earlier there are 212 potential
networks. In the network g we write gij = 1 with i 6= j if players i and j
have formed a link in g. On the contrary, if they are not connected we write
gij = 0. Players make their decision one after another. Let ρ(g) = 1, 2, 3, 4
be the rule of order where ρ = 1 for the market leader of our game. Each
player k can take decisions to form links. The actions of player k are de-
noted by g(k). Every player decides to form (or not) a link with the three
other players. Consequently, g(1) = (g12, g13, g14), g(2) = (g21, g23, g24),
g(3) = (g31, g32, g34) and g(4) = (g41, g42, g43). To sum up each player has
to take three decisions: g(i) = {1, 0}3 for all i ∈ N .
We define g(−1) = {g(2), g(3), g(4)} as the actions taken by players
other than 1. We have a similar definition for player 2, 3 and 4. With a
slight abuse of notation, we write g = {g(i), g(−i)} with i ∈ N . Finally, let
g−k = {g(1), ..., g(k− 1)} and g
+
k = {g(k+1), ..., g(4)} represent respectively
the actions of players that play before and after player k. The first term
is fixed as these players played before but the second term varies. Player k
knows the actions of the preceding players but not the actions of the follow-
ing players.
Here is the intuition of the equilibrium notion. Each player k wants to
maximize his profit denoted by pik(g). However individual profits depend
on the actions chosen by the other players. Each player needs to take into
account the strategies of the preceding and the following players. Formally,
player k has to solve:
max{pik(g) : (g(k)|g(−k))}
st.g ∈ G
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The first step to define our equilibrium is to study the case of the last
player (fourth player in our case). We begin with the strategy of the last
player and then we will study the strategies of the preceding players. It is
the principle of backward induction.
The strategy of the last player (player 4 in our setting) is the simplest.
He has to maximize his profit according to the actions of the preceding
players (this set is already fixed). As they are no other players after him he
does not have to take into account what the following players may decide.
His decision is the last decision of the game and determines all the payoffs.
Formally, player 4 has to solve:
max{pi4(g) : (g(4)|g
−
4
)}
The strategies of player 1, 2 and 3 (g−
4
) are fixed. Only g(4) can vary.
The actions available for player 4, where g−
4
, is fixed are represented by
this set:
Gn−1 = {g ∈ G : pi4(g) = max{pi4(g) : (g(4)|g(−4))}}
In our setting, due to transitivity, a player may be indifferent between
two actions. Concretely if two players i and j form a component and that
a third player l wants to create a link with this component, he is indifferent
between creating a link with i or j. In order to have uniqueness of equi-
librium we define a tie-breaking rule to define the action chosen if there is
indifference between two actions. For that, we look at the lexicographical
order. To define it quickly, let suppose that we have two pairs a = (a1, a2)
and b = (b1, b2). The set a is lexicographically preferred to b if a1 > b1 or
if a1 = b1 and a2 > b2. In our setting if player k has two possible sets of
actions and that he is indifferent between the two sets of actions, we choose
the lexicographically greater set. Let suppose that we have g(k) = (1, 1, 0)
and g′(k) = (1, 0, 1) two sets of actions that leads to the same profit, i.e.
pik(g) = pik(g
′). We say that g is lexicographically preferred to g′, i.e. g ≻ g′.
Player k forms two links with the players that play earlier in the game.
Formally the restricted set of feasible actions for the last player is:
Gn−1 = {g ∈ Gn−1 : pi4(g) = pi4(g
′) =⇒ g(4) ≻ g′(4), ∀g′ ∈ Gn−1}
For the player that plays before the last player (player 3 in our setting),
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the maximisation problem is the following:
max{pin−1(g) : (g(n− 1)|g
−
n−1)}
st.g ∈ Gn−1
The third player knows the actions taken by the player 1 and 2. This
is fixed. However player 4 has not already chosen his set of actions. When
player 3 takes his decision it will define the actions that player 4 should take
to maximize his profit.
Then we generalize the problem at the k-level. The set of potential
actions are given by:
Gk = {g ∈ Gk+1 : pik+1(g) = max{pik+1(g) : (g(k + 1)|g
−
k+1)}}
We restrict the set of feasible actions with our tie-breaking rule:
Gk = {g ∈ Gk : pik+1(g) = pik+1(g
′) =⇒ g(k + 1) ≻ g′(k + 1), ∀g′ ∈ Gk}
The maximisation problem of a player k can be written:
max{pik(g) : (g(k)|g
−
k )}
st.g ∈ Gk
We present an example to illustrate the definition of a subgame perfect
equilibrium. We assume that min ci < V < max ci (CT treatment). More
precisely we have c1 < c2 < c3 < V < c4 and 3V > c4. Like in our definition
we begin with the last player. Player 4 wants to maximize his profit. He has
an information: the actions of player 1,2 and 3. He has to solve:
max{pi4(g) : (g(4)|g
−
4
)}
He has two potential actions. His choice depends on the actions of the pre-
ceding players. If he faces the empty network (player 1,2 and 3 did not form
any link), he remains passive because otherwise he would loose money. How-
ever if he faces a three-player component (player 1,2 and 3 are linked) he has
to create one link to be connected to this component. In this second case, he
has a strictly positive payoff. Because of perfect transitivity, he is indifferent
between creating a link with 1, 2 or 3. Our tie breaking rule stipulates that
if a player is indifferent, he decides to link with the player that moves first
in the sequential game. In our case, player 4 creates a link with player 1 if
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he faces a three-player component.
Now, let study the feasible actions of player 3. Player 3 knows the action
of 1 and 2 as they played earlier in the game. His action will orientate the
action that player 4 has to take to maximize his payoff. The maximisation
problem of player 3 is:
max{pi3(g) : (g(3)|g
−
3
)}
st.g ∈ Gn−1
Player 3 can create 0,1,2 or 3 links, i.e. g(3) = (g31, g32, g34). If he faces
the empty network player 3 has to create links to have a strictly positive
payoff. However he does not create more than two links. Indeed he knows
that the action of creating two links will “oblige” the fourth player to cre-
ate one link as player 4 will face a three-player component. Player 3 forms
two links, one with player 1 and another one with player 2 because of the
tie-breaking rule. Player 2 wants to maximize his profit but knows that his
action will impact on the decisions of player 3 and 4. If he does not create
links, player 3 and 4 will have to form links to maximize their payoff. We
make the same reasoning for player 1.
To sum up, to reach the SPE, player 4 has to create a link with player
1 and player 3 has to create two links, one with player 1 and another with
player 2. Formally, g(1) = g(2) = ∅, g(3) = (1, 1, 0) and g(4) = (1, 0, 0).
Our tie-breaking rule allows us to have a unique equilibrium. However
we can easily define the other equilibrium. For our example, all the networks
where player 4 creates one link and player 3 creates two links are SPE.
3.5 Results
We can divide the results into two parts. First we provide the overall results
of the model. Second we focus on few interesting and problematic situations
by parametrizing the variables.
3.5.1 General results
Players can create links and benefit from the partners they are linked with.
If they are the initiator of the link they have to pay a connection cost.
The principle of transitivity is very important in our model. Players benefit
from their direct and indirect links without decay (benefits do not depend
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on distance). Benefits flow via paths and every player that is part of the
component can benefit from these benefits because information flows both
ways and without decay. At the maximum players should create three links
in the network that involve the four players in a unique component. As we
have transitivity, creating more than three links is useless. As a consequence
remaining passive can be a good strategy if the other players create a con-
nection with this player.
Remark 1 Let the payoff be given by (1) or (2). A network should always
have no more than three links if it creates a unique component of four players.
The network formation process is dependent on the order. The position
of players in the network mainly defines their strategies. The last player is
in a very disadvantageous position in many situations in both models if the
group wants to reach the equilibrium. As the previous players know that
this player will have no choice but creating links if he wants a positive profit,
they can remain passive. Consequently the SPE is often the CSS with the
last player in the center. In the major part of the situations the last player
(highest-cost or lowest-value player) has to sacrifice himself for the others.
To reach the equilibrium, the last player has to form as many links as he can.
Formally, if player i is the last player of the game and µi(g)Vj − µ
d
i (g)ci > 0
he has to create some links. If the last player cannot create all the links,
the penultimate player has to create the rest of the links to involve the four
players in the network. Again, if the links created by the two players are not
enough to involve the four players, the second player will create the links.
Finally, the first player can create links if the others cannot create all the
links necessary to reach the equilibrium.
Remark 2 Due to backward induction, the last player is the central player
of the CSS in numerous situations of both treatments. Consequently, he has
to incur all the linking costs.
About efficiency, for the CT the efficient network is always the CSS with
the first player (lowest-cost player) as central player if V > c1. However, if
3V < 3c1 the first player cannot have a positive payoff if he creates all the
links. In this case, the first player creates as many links as he can (until his
payoff is just above zero) and player 2 creates the necessary links to involve
the four players in the network. For the VT, every minimally connected
network is efficient. The sole condition is to have three links in the network
that connect the four players.
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Proposition 1 The efficient network for the CT is the CSS with the first
player (say player 1) as central player if V > c1. For the VT every minimally
connected network is efficient if 3Vj > c.
Now let just define the conditions to have the empty network for the CT
and the VT. For the CT, if V < ci for all i and µi(g)V < µ
d
i (g)ci for all
i 6= j the equilibrium network is the empty network. Similarly, for the VT, if
Vi < c for all i and µi(g)Vj < µ
d
i (g)c for all i 6= j the equilibrium network is
the empty network. Now let study some specific situations by parametrizing
the variables.
3.5.2 Specific situations
We begin with the analysis of particular situations with the CT.
Cost-treatment
In this case, we have heterogeneity in costs but homogeneous values, i.e.
Vi = V . We rank the players according to their costs. For more simplicity
we assume that c1 < c2 < c3 < c4. The lowest-cost player plays first and is
the market leader. We present four situations.
First situation
The first situation assumes a high homogeneous value compared to the
costs of linking. More precisely we assume V > max ci. Every player can
create all the links.
Second situation
Contrary to the first case, here the value of players is very low. More
precisely, we assume V < ci < 2V for all i. No player can create all the links
but if they coordinate, players can form a network.
Third situation
In this case the value V is intermediate, i.e. min ci < V < max ci. More
precisely we choose c1 < c2 < c3 < V < c4 and we add a condition: 3V > c4.
Player 1, 2 and 3 can create all the links but player 4 can also create one
link if he is connected with a three-player component.
Fourth situation
In this situation, V is again intermediate. More precisely we have c1 <
V < c2 < c3 < c4 < 2V . Player 1 is the only one who can create links
18
individually without depending on the others but the others can create one
link if they are connected with a two-player component.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of each situation is presented in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let the payoff be given by (1).
1. If V > max ci, the equilibrium network is the CSS with the highest-cost
player as central player.
2. If V < ci < 2V for all i the equilibrium network is a network where the
three last players (with the highest costs) create each one link with the
first player and the low-cost player remains passive. It is a PSS with
the first player as central player.
3. If c1 < c2 < c3 < V < c4 and 3V > c4, to reach the equilibrium
network player 4 must create a link with player 1 and player 3 must
create a link with player 1 and 2.
4. If c1 < V < c2 < c3 < c4 < 2V the equilibrium network is a network
where the three last players (with the highest costs) create each one link
with the first player and the low-cost player remains passive. It is a
PSS with the first player as central player.
Here is the intuition of the proposition for the first situation. Every
player is able to connect to everyone in the sense that they all have a cost of
linking lower than the value of others. The main component that determines
the SPE is the order. Let assume that we have c1 < c2 < c3 < c4 < V , the
best response of player 4 to the empty network is to be connected to the
rest of the players. Player’s 3 best response to the empty network is also
to create links with all the players. But he knows that it is also the best
response of 4 when the network is empty. We apply the same reasoning for
player 2 and 1. Consequently, because of the order and backward induction,
the last player (player with the highest cost) has to create all the links. This
solution is counter-intuitive as the highest-cost player bears all the linking
costs.
In the second situation, contrary to the first case, the value of players is
very low. A network can still be formed thanks to transitivity but players
need to coordinate because one player cannot create all the links. Indeed
if one player is indirectly connected with another player, he benefits from
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this connection without paying for it. No player can create a link without
being connected to a component of at least two players and no player can
create two links. The best response of each player to the empty network is
to create no link. However the best response of player 4 if it exists a compo-
nent of two players (a link has already been created between two players) is
to connect with this component. Player 3 has the same best response if he
faces a component of two players. But he knows that player 4 has the same
best response. Each of them can create one link at the maximum. Player
2 has the same best response and knows that 3 and 4 will create a link to
be connected to the component. Player 1 knows that the best responses of
the followers is either the empty network (in this case player 1 cannot create
links) or that each of them will create one link. In the second case his best
response is also to remain passive because the followers will do the necessary
connections and include him in the network. Each of them must create one
link to create a component of four players and allow the diffusion of the
benefits thanks to transitivity. Each of the three last players has to form a
link with another player. They are indifferent concerning their partner. Our
tie-breaking rule suggests that if a player is indifferent between two links, he
chooses the partner that plays the earliest in the game. Here player 2, 3 and
4 create one link with player 1. The architecture of the SPE is a PSS with
player 1 as central player.
We have the same reasoning for the third situation where V is interme-
diate, i.e. min ci < V < max ci. More precisely we choose c1 < c2 < c3 <
V < c4 and we add a condition: 3V > c4. Even if player 4 has a cost higher
than V , he can still create one link thanks to transitivity. Indeed we assume
that if he is linked to a component of 3 players and that he only creates one
link with this component, he has still a positive profit. On the contrary if
3V < c4 player 4 cannot do anything and is only dependent on the others.
To come back to our case, player 4 wants to be connected to a component
of 3 players. However he can only create one link. The best response of
player 4 when he faces the empty network is to create no link, otherwise he
would loose money. But if he can reach a component of three players his best
response is to create a link. Player 3 can create as many links as he wants
but he knows that the best response of player 4 when he faces a three-player
component is to create a link. Player 3 knows that if he is part of a three-
player component, player 4 will link with him (directly or indirectly). The
best response of player 3 to the empty network is to create two links. Player
1 and 2 have the same reasoning but know that player 3 will form links if he
faces the empty network. Player 4’s best response is to create one link with
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player 1 (because of the tie-breaking rule) and player 3’s best response is to
create a link with player 1 and 2 (because of the tie-breaking rule). Player
1 and 2 attract the benefits of linking without paying for it.
Finally for the fourth situation V is again intermediate. In the case where
c1 < V < c2 < c3 < c4 < 2V , player 1 is the only one who can create links
individually without depending on the others. Player 2, 3 and 4 can create
one link if they are connected to a component of at least two players. The
reasoning is the same than in the previous case. The best response of player
2, 3 and 4 to the empty network is to create zero link. For player 1 the best
response to the empty network would be to create three links. However the
best response of player 4 if he faces a component of at least two players is to
create a link with this component. Player 2 and 3 face the same situation.
If we follow our tie-breaking rule, the SPE is a PSS with the first player as
central player.
These results seem counter-intuitive as the player with the lowest cost
always remain passive even in situations where he could create all the links.
This is due to the order of turn and backward induction. We can say that
in the four situations, the last player is in a disadvantageous position.
Now let study efficiency. The efficient network of each situation is de-
scribed in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let the payoff be given by (1).
1. If V > max ci, the efficient network is the CSS with the lowest-cost
player as central player.
2. If V < ci < 2V for all i the efficient network is a network where the
first three players (with the lowest costs) create each one link and the
highest-cost player remains passive.
3. If c1 < c2 < c3 < V < c4 and 3V > c4, the efficient network is the
CSS with the low-cost player as central player.
4. If c1 < V < c2 < c3 < c4 < 2V the efficient network is the CSS with
the low-cost player as central player.
We give the intuition of these results. In the CT, it is less expansive at
the aggregate level to form the network if the low-cost player incurs all the
costs. That is why the first player is the center of the CSS in three situations.
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If we compare with the SPE results, we have non coincidence between the
equilibrium and the efficient network.
For the second situation, the first player cannot create all the links be-
cause of the low values. They can create one link at the maximum. To
minimize the aggregate cost of linking, the first three players (who have a
lower cost of linking than player 4) has to create one link. The network can
have many different architectures: PSS, line, mixed-star, etc. as long as the
first three players create each one link.
We do not have coincidence of equilibrium and efficiency in this treat-
ment. In the CT we have coincidence between the equilibrium and efficiency
if and only if the linking cost of the leader is very low and the linking cost of
the other players is extremely high. In this case the equilibrium and efficient
network is the CSS with player 1 as central player.
Here is a graphic representation of the equilibrium and efficient networks.
When there is a filled circle on a link adjacent to one player, it means that
this player created the link. For the SPE, we draw the equilibrium found
when we apply the tie-breaking rule. Other networks can be SPE. About
efficiency, in the second situation, the efficient network can have different
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architectures: PSS, mixed-star, etc. We just provide one possible efficient
network to give an example.
Value-treatment
In this case we have heterogeneity in values but homogeneous costs of
linking, i.e. ci = c. We rank players according to their values. The highest-
value player is the market leader. The main finding is that the results are
similar with the cost-treatment. The reasoning is quite the same and the
order is still the prominent determinant. Let assume V1 > V2 > V3 > V4 for
more simplicity.
First situation
We analyse the case where the cost of linking is very low compared to
the values of agents. More precisely we have minVi > c. Every player can
create all the links.
Second situation
Now we analyse the opposite situation where the cost of linking is very
high compared to the values of players. More precisely we set c > Vi for all
i and 3Vj > c for all j 6= i. At the maximum a player can create one link if
players coordinate.
Third situation
As in the second situation, we have a high cost of linking but the gap
between the values and this cost is smaller. In this case we have c > Vi for
all i and 3Vj > 2c for all j. It means that each player can create two links
(not only one) if they coordinate.
Fourth situation
Finally the last situation involves an intermediate cost. Let maxVi >
c > minVi and 3Vj > 2c.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of each above situation is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let the payoff be given by (2).
1. If minVi > c the equilibrium network is the CSS with the lowest-value
player as central player.
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2. If c > Vi for all i and that 3Vj > c for all j 6= i the equilibrium network
is a network where the three lowest-value players create each one link
with the first player. The SPE is a PSS with the first player as central
player.
3. If c > Vi for all i and that 3Vj > 2c for all j the equilibrium network is
a network where player 4 creates two links (with player 1 and 2) and
player 3 creates one link with the first player.
4. If maxVi > c > minVi for all i and that 3Vj > 2c for all j the
equilibrium network is a network where player 4 creates two links (with
player 1 and 2)and player 3 creates one link.
The reasoning is the same than in the cost-treatment. For the first sit-
uation, we assume V1 > V2 > V3 > V4 > c. Every player can create all the
links and keep a positive payoff. The best response of player 4 when he faces
the empty network is to create all the links. Player 1, 2 and 3 could also
play this strategy but they have the information that the following players
can bear the costs. Player 4 has no choice but creating all the links. The
order is still very decisive. With transitivity, it is not necessary to have the
high-value player as central player as soon as he is part of the network.
With the second situation we can say that players cannot create links
separately. But if players coordinate they can form a network thanks to
transitivity. Player 1 knows that players 2, 3 and 4 can each create a link they
face a three-player component. Player 1 remains passive. This minimally
connected network involving the four players can take many architectures:
line, PSS, mixed-star, etc. If we apply our tie-breaking rule, the SPE is the
PSS network with the first player as central player. We do not develop the
reasoning for the last two situations as it is exactly the same principle than
in the CT. Now let study the efficient network of each situation.
Proposition 5 Let the payoff be given by (2). In every situation, the ef-
ficient network is a minimally connected network. The sole condition is to
create three links involving the four players in a unique component.
It means that whoever creates links, as soon as the 4 players are con-
nected, the network is efficient. We find this result because the cost is the
same for all connections, so it does not change the aggregate payoff. In the
VT the equilibrium and the efficient network can coincide more frequently.
Here is a graphic representation of the above propositions.
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For the SPE, we draw the equilibrium found when we apply the tie-
breaking rule. Other networks can be SPE. For efficiency, networks can have
different architectures. We just provide an example of solution.
To sum up, both treatments have the same reasoning and the order seems
to be the prominent determinant. We only have one difference between the
two treatments. The difference is that we can have coincidence between the
equilibrium and the efficient network in the VT while it is almost impossible
in the CT.
To conclude, we can say that star networks and minimally connected net-
works are prominent in our model. Globally the same architectures emerge
than in the connection model of Bala and Goyal, but we have more stability
thanks to heterogeneity. About efficiency a natural candidate emerges to
take the position of central player in the CT: the low-cost player. But in the
VT every minimally connected network is efficient. The high-value player is
not always the center of the star contrary to the paper of Goeree et al [19].
This is due to perfect transitivity (benefits do not decrease with distance in
our model). A final word about this model is to say that playing first is often
an advantage and playing last can be a very bad position in the network.
The market leader has often the highest payoffs.
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4 The experiment
The formation of networks with heterogeneous players is hard to study in
the field. It is difficult to measure the values and linking costs of agents. In
contrast, the laboratory enables us to control all the variables that impact
the behaviour of players. The three papers ([3], [13] and [19]) presented in
our experimental literature inspired our experimental procedure.
We have two treatments, an endogenous and an exogenous treatment
(baseline treatment). Each treatment consists of a CT and a VT (heteroge-
neous costs and a homogeneous value or heterogeneous values and a homo-
geneous cost). In the endogenous treatment, the experiment consists of two
parts. In the first part, the values and the costs of linking are revealed by
each player thanks to tests. In the second part, players decide in a sequen-
tial manner with whom they want to form a link according to these variables.
The baseline treatment only consists of the network formation part. Con-
trary to the endogenous treatment, we randomly assign characteristics for
the players.
4.1 The baseline treatment
We begin the presentation of the experiment with the baseline treatment.
Participants are randomly assigned to a group of four players. The pur-
pose is to see which types of networks emerge. Our model gives 212 = 4096
potential networks. For the sake of simplification, we focus on the specific
situations described in the theoretical results.
We assign one specific situation to each group of four players. They play
either the CT or the VT (not both) and remains in the same situation (for
example the second situation of the CT) during the whole experiment. The
design of our experiment is based on a between-subject design because we
want to avoid that a treatment impacts on the other treatment and because
the order of exposure can change the behaviour of participants.1 When
groups are formed and that each group is assigned to a specific situation,
we parametrize the costs and values and assign them randomly within the
1Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn [7] explained the differences between these two designs
and their advantages and disadvantages.
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group. The four situations for the CT are described in the first column of
the following table.
For example, the first group of four players is assigned to the first situa-
tion. Players in this group have a high value (5) compared to their cost of
linking. We assign a cost of 1 to one player, another player has a cost of 2,
another has a cost of 3 and the last player has a cost of 4. In each group,
players have a complete information. They know their own cost and value
and the costs and value of the other group members. It can be a problem
because players are aware of the inequalities between them. The gap can be
wide and players may fell envious or guilty.
As we said players move one after another and we rank them according
to their cost. The leader is the player with the lowest cost (c1 = 1) and plays
first. Player 2, 3 and 4 play after him in a sequential manner. The leader
can form links with the three other players. He can decide to form 0, 1, 2
or 3 links. The three players cannot move but are present in the game. In
this situation, for player 1 a link is valuable (he earns 5 EMUs2 by link) but
he has to pay a cost of 1 EMU for each link created. When he has taken
his decisions of linking, player 2 can play. Player 2 can observe the choices
of player 1 and make his decisions. An important point is to see if player 1
created a link with him or not. If player 1 created a link with player 2, player
2 earns 5 EMUs without paying a linking cost, because player 1 is an indirect
neighbour. Player 2 can also link with the three players. When player 2 has
finished to play, it is the turn of player 3 and then of player 4. They can all
2Experimental Monetary Unit
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observe the previous decisions of the game. When the fourth player confirms
his decisions, the network is formed. No player can modify his actions. The
profit for this period is calculated and given to the participants. They know
their own profit for this period but not the profit of the three other players.
They repeat the network formation process with the same group during 20
periods.
The situations for the VT are depicted in the first column.
Like in the CT each situation is assigned to one group of four players.
The difference with the CT is that there is a unique cost inside each group
but values differ across players. If we take the first situation, player 1 has
the highest value. If player 2 forms a link with player 1, he benefits from the
value of player 1 (5) but incurs a linking cost equals to 1. We have the same
procedure than in the CT. The network formation process is similar than in
the CT and also lasts 20 periods.
We use a partner matching protocol (groups remain the same during
the experiment) to facilitate the coordination and the learning effect.3 The
learning effect and the coordination is easier if players remain partners. But
to avoid that a player in “bad position” (for example the low-value player
in the VT) remains in this position during the whole experiment (he has to
bear all the linking costs if the group wants to reach the equilibrium) we
rematch the groups in the middle of the experiment. There is a probability
3Van Leeuwen, Offerman and Schram [30] point out that coordination is even more
complicated with a stranger matching.
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that by changing groups players will be at a different position in the net-
work.4 Each group repeats the network formation process for ten periods
before we rematch the groups. Players do not know exactly when we will
change the groups to avoid the change of behaviour during the last period
before the rematching.
Payoff
In the baseline treatment, the profit only depends on the network formed
inside the group. The profit of player i in the network game, pii(g), depends
on the value of his partners and on his cost of linking. If player i plays the
CT, his payoff is the following:
pii(g) = µi(g)V − µ
d
i (g)ci
If player i plays the VT, his payoff is the following:
pii(g) = µi(g)Vj − µ
d
i (g)c
We randomly choose one period and reward them with their behaviour in
this period (random draw). This method encourages the players to do their
best for each period.5 The second and third columns of each table gives the
profit of each player and the aggregate profit if they reach the equilibrium
or if they form an efficient network.
4.2 The endogenous treatment
Like in the baseline treatment, we have two treatments. The first treatment
(CT) assumes heterogeneity in costs but homogeneous values. The second
(VT) assumes heterogeneous values but homogeneous costs. The difference
with the baseline treatment is that we add a preliminary stage. The exper-
iment consists of two parts. The first part is the revelation of values and
costs by each player thanks to tests. Consequently their characteristics are
4The probability of changing ranking depends on the initial ranking of the players.
Obviously it does not solve the problem for the “extreme” players. Indeed the lowest-
value, highest-value, lowest-cost and highest-cost players are always in the same position
in a group.
5Alternatively, we could have decided to take the average of the payoffs during the
whole experiment. Similarly we could also decide to sum the payoff of each period. The
problem is that players who are in “bad positions” have lower profits on average. For
example, if the low-value player is constrained by the group to create all the links, his
payoff will be smaller and the gap with the other players will increase. We will have high
inequalities.
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endogenous instead of arbitrary. The second part is the network formation
process. This part is exactly the same than in the baseline treatment except
that the costs and values are not assigned randomly.
In the major part of the literature, characteristics are exogenous. Endo-
geneity brings a new perspective, because players are at the origin of their
characteristics. The comparison between the exogenous treatment and this
treatment allows the check the contribution of endogenous characteristics.
In the first stage, players make some tests to reveal their characteristics.
They are rewarded and ranked according to their performance. Concerning
the revelation part, participants in the CT only reveal their cost. The value
of players is given exogenously. Symmetrically, participants in the VT only
reveal their value. The linking cost is given by the experimenter. Like in the
exogenous treatment, we use a between-subject design, so every player only
plays one treatment (CT or VT).
Puzzle
Participants play this game if they play the value-treatment. The goal of
this test is to assess the value, the ability and the creativity of each player.
This task does not require any particular technique. Players just need or-
ganization, concentration and ability to solve it as fast as they can. There
are no initial inequalities between players. There is time constraint and the
fastest player receive the highest value. The slowest player to solve the puz-
zle will have the lowest value.
English test
Participants play this game if they play the cost-treatment. The link-
ing costs of agents are revealed by an English test (the mother tongue of
our participants is French). We assume that the capacity in English reveals
the communication skill of the player because English allows communica-
tion around the world. Words in French will appear one by one on their
computer. Participants will have to translate them into English. They can
take all the time they want before confirming their answer. There will be
twenty words in total from the easiest to the hardest. We relate negatively
the performance at this test with the costs of linking. When players answer
correctly, their linking cost decreases. The best player will have the lowest
cost. The player who gave the fewest number of correct answers will have
the highest cost.
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If two players have the same score (for the puzzle or the English test), the
software randomly chooses the order between the two players. At the end of
the task they know their ranking but not how much they earned exactly to
avoid wealth effect.
After the revelation part, players are randomly assigned to a group of
four participants. Their assignment does not depend on their performance.
Then, we assign a situation to each group. They play in the same situation
during the whole experiment. Inside each group of four players, we rank
them according to their performance. In the CT, we assign the lowest cost
to the player that gave the maximum number of correct answers (compared
with the three other group members). The second best player has the second
lowest cost. The fourth player of the group has the highest cost of the sit-
uation. Similarly, in the VT, we assign the highest value to the player that
solved the puzzle faster (compared with the three other group members).
The second best player has the second highest value. The fourth player of
the group has the lowest value of the situation. Players know the values and
costs of each player in their group (including their own cost and value).
For example, in the first situation of the CT we assign a cost of linking
equal to 1 to the player who gave the maximum number of correct answers
during the English test (compared with his three group members). The
player with the lowest number of correct answers will have a linking cost of
4.
Even if players do not determine exactly their value or cost, their perfor-
mance is at the origin of their position in the network. The literature shows
that endogeneity counters the impact of social motives. Participants have
more strategic behaviours if they earned their position. Here the leader is in
the first position because he performed better than the three other players
of his group.
Payoff
The total payoff of the players in the endogenous treatment depends on
two things: their profit during the task (puzzle if VT or English test if CT)
and their profit in the network formation game. The profit in the network
game, pii(g), depends on the value of their partners and on the costs of
linking:
pii(g) = µi(g)Vj − µ
d
i (g)ci
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Then we add a more or less high supplement according to their performance
in the first part.
Experimentally, it is not possible to test all the specific situations. We
need many observations of one situation to analyse the results. It would
require many experimental sessions. For the experiment, the most interest-
ing cases are the first situation of the CT and the VT where the cost is
low compared to the value of players. Every player can create all the links.
The analysis of these two situations will enable us to see the contribution of
sequentiality and heterogeneity in the network formation process.
5 Predictions
According to our model, participants should play the SPE. However our
behavioural predictions are different. Efficiency and fairness concerns may
affect the emergence of equilibrium networks. Moreover the experiment will
highlight the role of objective characteristics thanks to the comparison be-
tween the endogenous and the exogenous treatment.
5.1 Theoretical predictions
Our model predicts that participants should play the equilibrium. We just
remind that in this case the last player incurs the major part of the linking
costs. In every situation of both treatments, the last player creates from one
to three links. On the contrary, the leader does not have to create any links.
This result is counter-intuitive as the leader does not create links.
However players may be guided by social factors. We present our be-
havioural predictions.
5.2 Social motives
Players make a tradeoff between self-interest and social motives. As Burger
and Buskens said “human subjects are more likely to choose equal and effi-
cient networks as the preferred networks” [5].
Efficiency concern This social motive may influence the behaviour of
the participants if they prefer a high aggregate payoff. We want to anal-
yse in which condition the efficient network emerges and more particularly
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which network emerges between the equilibrium and the efficient network.
The efficiency concern has been widely witnessed in network experiments.
Charness and Rabin [8] made tests to measure the efficiency concern and
found that participants do not always choose to maximize their own payoff.
Participants play a more efficient network if it does not increase inequalities
too much.
As we pointed out earlier the major difference between the VT and the
CT is that in the former the equilibrium and efficiency can coincide while
it is not possible in the latter (in the situations we chose to study). In the
CT the efficient network emerges when the first player creates all the links
or the first three players create each one link. In the VT it is far more easily
to form an efficient network. Indeed all minimally connected networks are
efficient. Three links that connect the four players are sufficient to create an
efficient network.
Hypothesis 1 Efficiency concerns will limit the emergence of equilibrium
networks. Many efficient networks should emerge in the VT. However in
the CT we do not think that the leader will sacrifice himself to reach the
efficiency.
Groups may try to tend to an efficient network. For instance, player 1
can decide to form one link to be closer to the efficient network but without
bearing all the costs.
Inequality aversion Experimentally, many authors witnessed the im-
pact of inequality aversion ([8], [14], [18]). Even if players are self-interested,
they prefer equitable outcomes. In some games, players decide to behave
fairly while the model predicts unfair behaviour. In our setting it means
that players will share the linking cost and not let the last player sacrifice
himself.
When there are inequalities of payoffs players can feel envious (if their
payoff is lower than the other players) or guilty (if their payoff is greater
than the other players). It is the case in the paper of Goeree et al. [19] and
the paper of Falk and Kosfeld [13] with the formation of stars that are very
unequal. The PSS of Berninghaus et al. [3] leads to less inequality in payoffs
because each peripheral player pays for one link. The most extreme case is
the experimental paper of Vanin [31] where players were able to talk before
the game. The inequality aversion was so strong within each group that
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sometimes it prevented the emergence of efficient networks. Some groups
decided to play the efficient network despite the inequalities but they redis-
tributed the payoffs after the experiment.
In our experiment, the VT treatment is more egalitarian than the CT. In
fact, the SPE and the efficient network in the CT are often the CSS where one
player bears all the costs of linking (first player if the group plays the efficient
network and last player if they play the equilibrium). On the opposite the
VT is less unequal. All minimally connected networks are efficient and not
obviously unequal. The SPE can also be the CSS but as the fourth player
benefits from the value of the others (that are greater than his own value)
inequalities are small even if he bears all the linking costs.
Hypothesis 2 Inequality aversion will limit the emergence of star networks.
The problem of inequality aversion is more prominent in the CT.
5.3 Coordination
Coordination can be very difficult in network formation. Many previous net-
work experiments witnessed this problem.
First we may have coordination problems to form star networks. Falk
and Kosfeld [13] found that the connection model predicts well the behaviour
of players in the one-way flow model but not with the two-way flow model.
One reason (it does not explain everything) is that it is harder to coordinate
on the CSS. The emergence of the CSS requires that one player creates all
the links and the others have to remain passive. It may be difficult in our
experiment that the four players understood that in some situations they
should remain passive for example. Berninghaus et al. [3] had less coordina-
tion problems with their experiment because they changed the environment.
For participants it is easier to coordinate on the PSS than on the CSS. An-
other reason is symmetry. The CSS is very asymmetric strategically and in
terms of payoffs.
Hypothesis 3 Coordination problems may restrain the number of star net-
works and more particularly of CSS.
Second, we may have a coordination problem for situations where value is
low or cost is high. In the CT some situations may be difficult for the players.
When value is low (4th situation) or very low (2nd situation), players have
to work together to have a positive payoff. Similarly in the VT the situations
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where the cost is high (3rd situation) and very high (2nd situations), players
have to coordinate.
5.4 Endogeneity contribution
This experiment has an additional purpose. We want to analyse the role of
some players in the network and more particularly the role of the market
leader.
Leadership, responsibility and legitimacy
The market leader has an advantage in our game. He has a high value
or a low cost compared to the others. Moreover he takes his decisions first.
He is going to orientate the network. In the VT the first player has a real
advantage as the other players want to be connected with him. If the group
wants to form the equilibrium network the first player needs to remain pas-
sive. However to create an efficient network, he can decide to form one link
(or more). In this case it will be interesting to see if the first player takes
his role of market leader and tries to build a network that is efficient and
egalitarian or if he is going to remain passive because he knows he is valu-
able. We may have two different types of market leader in the VT: leaders
or free-riders.
In the paper of Figuières, Masclet and Willinger [15] the authors also
made a sequential game. Players can make voluntary contributions to a
public good in a sequential manner and can (or not) observe the contribu-
tions of the previous players. They found that contribution increases when
they can observe previous contributions. They made a second observation
that is interesting for our experiment: the leadership effect. The first player
contributes more to encourage the others to make a larger contribution. This
effect vanishes when the game moves toward the last player.
In the CT the first player has less advantage. If the group tends to the
equilibrium the market leader remains passive. However if the first player
wants the network to be efficient he has to create the maximum of links he
can. In this case he sacrifices himself and bears some linking costs. Here
the difference between the two situations is even more striking. In the first
situation the leader only benefits from the others and in the second situa-
tion the others benefit from him. The difference between the two types of
market leaders is even stronger. The first player may decide to free-ride or
to take his role of leader to coordinate the network to an efficient network
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by creating all the links.
To sum up, the leader may have two different types of behaviour.
Hypothesis 4 The leader may decide to be selfish or to be the coordinator
of the network. We think that the first player will be more altruistic in the
CT to reach an efficient network even if he will bear some linking costs. In
the VT we do not think that the first player will create links as he knows that
he is the most valuable and that players will link with him.
Contribution of objective characteristics
One major difference in our procedure compared to the rest of the lit-
erature on network formation is that the characteristics of the players are
not exogenous nor arbitrary. They depend on their performance in a pre-
liminary task. We think that this change will impact the behaviour of the
agents. That is the reason why we created a control treatment with random
variables. We want to control the effect of objective characteristics.
The literature ([9], [20] and [26]) witnessed the “earnings effect”. The au-
thors show that when a player earned his dominant position, he behaves more
strategically than if this position has been randomly assigned. He behaves
more strategically because he feels legitimate. He has a moral authority. In
our endogenous treatment the leader should be more strategic than in the
exogenous treatment as he deserves his position. He will probably remain
passive and let the others create the links. Similarly, the fourth player should
accept his position more easily than if we ranked him randomly at this place
as his performance was worse than his three group members. He accepts to
create links even if it is not advantageous.
Hypothesis 5 We think that the first player will be more strategic in the
endogenous treatment than in the exogenous treatment. The fourth player
should accept his position in the network more easily and bears some linking
costs. Endogeneity should partly counter the impact of social motives.
5.5 Punishment
In some cases players have the power to punish his group members. We
present one example to illustrate it. In the first situation of the cost-
treatment, the SPE is the CSS with player 4 as central player and the efficient
network is the CSS with player 1 as central player. If the group wants to
reach the equilibrium, player 4 will have to bear all the linking costs. It may
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be possible that player 4, when he faces the empty network, decides to create
a link with player 2 and 3 but not with player 1. It would be a sanction for
player 1, a signal sent to player 1 to incite him to create links. Even if he
looses money for this period (a link with player 1 would increase his payoff)
it can be a way to orientate the network to a more efficient network.
5.6 Protect the little brother
Finally, a last behaviour may appear in our experiment. In the CT the
last player has a high cost of linking and it may be very costly for him to
be part of a component. The other players may feel altruistic toward this
player. They can create a link with him to be sure that he will be part of
the component without having to pay a high linking cost. It would protect
the “little brother”. This behaviour may be guided by altruism (warm glow
or pure altruism).
6 Conclusion
Network formation is a very wide field with diverse applications. Bala and
Goyal show that networks can be unstable. Our goal is to add two properties
to their model to solve instability: heterogeneity and sequentiality. Players
are heterogeneous in the sense that they are more or less valuable and they
have different communication skills (heterogenous values and costs). We
built two treatments: a cost-treatment (with heterogeneous costs but a ho-
mogeneous value) and a value-treatment (with heterogeneous values and a
homogeneous cost). Players can create links unilaterally and benefit from
their direct and indirect links. Information flows both ways, so we have a
perfect transitivity. As we add a sequentiality property, players will play one
after another. The leader (most valuable or lowest cost player) plays first.
The profit of a player increases with the number of connections but decreases
with the cost of linking. We display the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game. The first major result is that no more than three links should be
created if the four players are involved in a unique component because of
transitivity. The equilibrium network architecture is often the star network
(CSS). The second important result is that the player in the last position
is in a disadvantageous situation. Indeed the preceding players can benefit
from him by remaining passive. When it is his turn the last player has no
choice but creating the maximum of links to have a positive payoff. Finally
we found out that the equilibrium network is not always efficient. Stability
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and efficiency rarely coincides.
We would like to test the model in the laboratory to see if our model
predicts well the behaviour of the participants. Many features may have an
important impact on the behaviour of participants. Three aspects of the
experiment will be interesting to study. The first purpose is to analyse if
decentralized decisions lead to an efficient or an equilibrium network. The
second goal is to measure the role of social motives. Indeed human sub-
jects are not only guided by their self-interest, they care about the payoff
of others. Finally, our experimental protocol has one particular character-
istic. Contrary to the major part of the literature, we build an endogenous
treatment where we do not give exogenous values and costs. Each player re-
veals his personal ability and communication skills in two preliminary tests.
Thanks to the comparison between the exogenous and the endogenous treat-
ment, we will be able to describe the “earning effect”. It means that players
behave more strategically if they earned their position than if it is arbitrary.
Further research is needed to have a better understanding of this complex
process. A first extension to this research paper is to introduce cheap talk
in the procedure. The idea is to give to the first player (leader) the power
to communicate with others. The purpose is to facilitate coordination and
to analyse the leadership effect. If behaviours of punishment and protection
of the “little brother” appear in the experimental results, it would be inter-
esting to deeper analyse these phenomena. Finally, the study of homophily
(tendency to link with similar agents) is another interesting extension. Ho-
mophily plays a major role in many real life situations. This principle can be
applied to marriage, friendship, relationships at work or information diffu-
sion for instance. In our setting it would be interesting to analyse if players
prefer to form connections with similar players or not.
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